Abstract: European Union military operations entail the participation of a new subject of international law in the area of peace and security. This organization constitutes a special subject of international law, and its internal structure and distribution of powers make difficult to determine, during the deployment of a military operation, the attribution of responsibility in case of breach of international law. This article aims to analyse the different aspects that affect the responsibility of the European Union by acts of its military operations, focusing on the theory and practice of the Organization and analysing issues as the effective control of the operations or the personnel involved.
INTRODUCTION
European Union missions abroad have risen in recent years and, although military operations are less common than civilian ones -there are currently eleven ongoing civilian missions and only five military operations, the particularities of these operations, their complexity, the effect they have on private individuals and the level of danger entailed require an analysis of their potential consequences in the event of a breach of International Law. This study will focus on the theory and practice of the European Union (EU). However, in relation to practice, it will take into account ongoing military operations in order to define the area of study.
The responsibility of the EU is currently a subject for debate in different forums, along with the responsibility of international organizations. One of the main outcomes of this active debate has been the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO), completed by the International Law Commission (ILC) in June 2011 and adopted by the General Assembly in December 2011. As established by the Special Rapporteur, the articles refer to "all the internationally wrongful acts committed by international organizations and the content and implementation of responsibility when an organization is responsible towards another organization or a state or the international community as a whole". The articles "also address questions relating to the responsibility for the conduct of an international organization, as well as the responsibility of an organization for the conduct of a state or another organization" 1 . Therefore these articles include secondary rules referring to breaches of international rules by international organizations, and their consequences. In this sense, and even though the articles on state responsibility can be considered as a codification, the ARIO is in the line of "progressive * Associate Professor of Public International Law, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville, Spain. Email: gfernandez@upo.es.
former CSDP, on the other hand, has been less studied. 13 This paper aims to analyse the responsibility of the EU from a different point of view, focusing on on-going military operations, their documents and practice, in order to reach a conclusion, not through general and theoretical analysis of the subject, but rather by studying the specific norms and the special circumstances applicable to these operations.
To establish the responsibility of the EU for the actions of its military operations, first and foremost, we must establish which norms might be breached by these operations. As mentioned previously, this subject has been studied by Naert and his conclusions will form the basis of this work. However, to gain a closer understanding of EU practices, references to these norms found in the documents of EU military operations must also be examined, in order to ascertain the specific obligations to which the EU is bound in these specific operations. Secondly, for the attribution of responsibility, the definition of the personnel involved in these operations will be decisive, as will their consideration as personnel of the EU, personnel of the contributing states or personnel at the disposal of the Organization. Although this matter has been studied in relation to international organizations, it requires in-depth analysis in relation to the EU.
Finally, the most controversial issue is that of effective control. Effective control and personnel have been widely studied especially in relation to the United Nations (UN), but this paper will focus its analysis on the EU, taking into account the chains of command and the responsibilities of the different bodies in EU operations.
In conclusion, the focus of this paper is to apply theoretical analysis of the responsibility of international organizations and the EU to the practices of specific on-going EU military operations.
INTERNATIONAL NORMS APPLICABLE TO EU OPERATIONS
Before analysing whether or not the EU can be held responsible for a breach of International Law resulting from the actions of its troops involved in a military operation, it is necessary to establish which rules affect these operations.
Taking into account the activity carried out by EU military operations, the rules relating to these activities might be international humanitarian Law, human rights law, the laws of the host state, the rules included in the agreements signed by the EU for deployed operations, as well as other rules of International Law.
'EC liability for the non-implementation of WTO dispute settlement decisions -Advocate general Albert proposes a 'Copernican Innovation' in the case law of the ECJ ', 6 Journal of International Economic Law (2003) 761-769. (1) International Humanitarian Law. Different Sources of Obligation
The application of international humanitarian law to EU military operations is a controversial matter, just as it is in relation to UN peace-keeping operations 14 and NATO operations. 15 The first question to resolve is when this law can be applicable, and as the majority of the doctrine affirms, 16 it must be applicable in situations of armed conflict. Therefore, this law is not directly applicable to a simple deployment of a military operation; 17 there must be an armed conflict.
However, this is not the only requirement; the organization's troops must also be involved in the conflict as combatants. 18 EU military operations to date have never been involved in an armed conflict as combatants. By way of an example, the five ongoing military operations 19 are deployed in countries where there is no military conflict, the operation EUTH Somalia, which could be considered as being deployed in a country in a situation of armed conflict, is actually deployed in Uganda, the host state; Seyersted, supra n. 11; Hirsch, , supra Zwanenburg, supra n. 11. 16 Bowett, supra n. 14, at. [493] [494] [495] [496] [497] [498] [499] [500] [501] [502] [503] [504] [505] [506] McCoubrey and White, supra n. 14, [156] [157] [158] [159] [160] Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 169; Cartledge, supra n. 14, at. 125; Naert, supra n. 13, at. 470. 17 Naert, supra n. 13, at. 469. 18 This is also the position of the United Nations as was established in the Secretary General Bulletin on the Observance by the United Nations forces on international humanitarian law. Section 1 sets up that "The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants". The Institut de Droit International also has affirmed that UN forces can be considered as belligerent in an armed conflict, therefore in these cases law of war should be applicable. See Bowett, supra n. 14, at. 499; McCoubrey and White, supra n. 14, at.156-160; Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 187. Regarding the existence of armed conflicts see M.J. Aznar Gómez, "La responsabilidad internacional de las organizaciones internacionales por daños al patrimonio cultural causados por sus misiones de paz", in J. Cardona Llorens, J. Pueyo Losa, J.L. Rodriguez-Villasante y Prieto (eds. as it is not party to those agreements. However, the rules contained in these conventions could be binding for the EU by other means.
It has been established, even by the EU, 24 that the rules of the Geneva Conventions are customary international law and, therefore, they must be applied by all subjects of International Law, 25 which refers to the EU, this applicability is supported by TEU and EU case law which states "that European Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers. It is therefore required to comply with the rules of customary international law when adopting a regulation…"
26
. One of the problems arising from this assertion is the question of which rules are applicable to a conflict in which the EU is involved. The rules of international armed conflict or the rules of internal armed conflict -which entails the application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and Protocol II relating to the Protection of Victims of In this respect, the participation of the EU in an armed conflict against another subject of International Law can be classed as international armed conflict owing to the participation of two subjects of International Law. In contrast to this opinion, there is a different view which considers confrontation between an international organization and an armed group to be an internal conflict. These two conventions contain the main rules on international humanitarian law, knowing as well as ius in bello or the law of armed conflict. Cartledge affirms that international humanitarian law includes law of armed conflict and also human rights law. Cartledge, supra n. 14, at. 134.
23
These conventions could be applicable to the EU, maybe as a conventional law, if they would have been include in the agreements conclude by the EU with third states to carry out the operations, but no agreements make reference to that rules neither the SOFA applicable to the ALTHEA operation that was the same applicable to NATO and included in Dayton Peace Agreement (Appendix A to Annex 1A). Zwanenburg, supra n. 13, at. 400. 25 The ICJ in its advisory opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between The WHO and Egypt ruled that "International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties". Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between The WHO and Egypt, I.C.J. Reports (1980) , at. 37. Hirsch refers to the UN operations in Korea and Congo where allegations of breached of customary laws of war were made. Hirsch, supra n. 11, at. 31-32. In relation to the applicability of the international humanitarian law to UN, Zwanenburg stated that article 1 (I), article 3 and article 103 of the UN Charter "together make clear that UN Security Council can derogate from customary law", when acting under the chapter VII of the UN Chapter. This would be an exception to the general rule settled in WHO advisory opinion. Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 143. 26 Case C- 162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR, 3655, at 3704. 27 McCoubrey and White, supra n. 14, at.170. 28 Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 182-186; Naert, supra n. 13, at. 491; Contrary to this opinion, McCoubrey and White. consider that the involvement of an international organization do not render the conflict international. See McCoubrey and White, supra n. 14, at.173. Sassòli considers that "if the EU or another international organization intervenes with the consent of de facto government of the State concerned against insurgent, then the law of non-international armed conflicts applies. On the contrary, if the intervention is directed against the forces of a de facto government of an existing State, then the law of international armed conflicts applies", M. Sassòli, "EU missions, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL)", in M.J. Aznar and M. Costas (eds), The Integration of the Human Rights This division between international and internal armed conflict could entail, as established previously, the application of different rules. However, in the case of customary international law, the received view is that the whole customary body can be applicable to both internal and international armed conflict. In this sense, the expression human rights should be understood in a broader sense to include humanitarian law.
Most

33
This broad interpretation of human rights indicates that the binding of the EU by international humanitarian law in grounded in its treaties.
The general principles of the EU have also been considered a source of obligation for the EU in humanitarian law. Naert supports this assertion in the "widespread and largely convergent ratification of LOAC treaty obligations by the EU member states and the close link between a number of such obligations and human rights". Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 201; Hirsch, supra n. 11, at. 32. 30 McCoubrey, and White, supra n. 14, at.. 158-160. These authors refer to those rules which may be accepted as customary law: "a range of proscriptions upon methods and means of warfare calculated to inflict 'unnecessary suffering', bans upon perfidious conduct and policies of 'no quarter', basic requirements of impartial and humane treatment of the wounded, sick and /or shipwrecked who abstain from hostile action, humane treatment of prisoners of war, and certain protection for civilians in zones of conflict".
31
McCoubrey and White, supra n. 14, at. [158] [159] [160] Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 200; Cortés Martín, supra n. 11. 32 Article 2 TEU, Article 3.5 TEU, Article 6.3 TEU, Article 21.1 TEU, Article 21.2 (c) TEU. 33 Zwanenburg, supra n. 13, at. 402. 34 Naert, supra n. 13, at. 536.
35
The Salamanca Declaration was the result of a seminar organized by the Spanish Presidency in April 2002-. This Declaration established that the political and military structures of the EU must ensure the application of the main rules of International Law, included international humanitarian law, when exercising strategic direction and political control. But as the author sets up "it is unclear whether this should be understood as referring to obligations of the European Union or as a policy statement". Zwanenburg, supra n. 13, at. 402. 36 Naert, supra n. 13, at. 528 M. Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 171; Cortés Martín, supra n. 11, at. 157. unilateral acts.
Council joint actions might be also considered a source of unilateral acts. Martín, supra n. 11, at. 124; Hirsch, supra n. 11, at. 30; Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 145; Naert, supra n. 13, at. 536. 44 Legal Consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian Territory, I.C.J. Reports (2004) . 45 Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 145. the structure of denunciation clauses, the criminalization of breaches and the limits on reciprocity; 46 hence, norms such as the prohibition of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide can be considered peremptory norms.
(2) The Obligation to Respect Human Rights in EU External Relations
As in the case of international humanitarian law, the EU can be bound by human rights rules by different means, and these norms will be apply also during peacetime.
48
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has also ruled that human rights laws are binding for the former EC, establishing that "fundamental Human Rights are part of the Community Law".
49
This statement was made in light of the lack of reference to human rights in the treaties, but it is still applicable, and confirms one of the EU's sources of obligation: the general principles of EU Law. 50 This gap has been solved through the reform of the treaties, and in the current Lisbon Treaty, references to respect for human rights are visible in different articles, constituting a source of obligation for the EU.
51
References to human rights in the TEU start in the Preamble, supporting the affiliation of the EU to human rights, and continue in Article 2 where human rights are considered one of the values on which the EU is founded. Among other references in Articles 3.5 and 21.2.b, Article 21.1 establishes that the action of the EU in the international arena shall be guided by respect for human rights, from which it is possible to infer that human rights shall be respected in EU operations abroad.
The references to human rights in the TEU constitute a source of obligation for the EU grounded in its own rules, but they are not the only one, since the inclusion of the Charter of It is also well known that human rights are an object of customary law and peremptory norms; however, as in the case of humanitarian law, there is no catalogue for customary human rights rules 52 or norms of jus cogens. In any case, both of them are also applicable to the EU as a subject of International Law and must been taken into account in the development of its operations. Ibid. at. 64. 48 Cartledge, supra n. 14, at. 134; Naert, "Accountability…,.supra n. 13, at. 384.
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Case 29/69 Erich Stauder v. Stadt Ulm -Sozialamt [1969] ECR 419, at. 425. Hirsch, supra n. 11, at. 44; Naert, "Accountability…, supra n. 13, at. 387.
50
The Court explains the general principles and traditions of member states. Hirsch, supra n. 11, at. 45. 51 In any case it has to be taking into account that the ECJ ruled the former Article 300.7 TEC should be considered as res inter alios acta. See Kuijper and Paasivirta, supra n. 12, at 134. the EU and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has been the object of various analyses and statements from the ECJ and ECHR. The ECJ has never considered the EU to be bound by the provisions of the Conventions since the Organization is not party to it. 53 Furthermore, the ECHR has maintained member states obligations under the Convention even though power has been transferred to the EU. Clearly the accession of the EU to the Convention would eliminate this controversial relationship.
Continuing with conventional obligations, the EU has signed different agreements in order to develop its military operations. As part of operation ATALANTA, the EU signed two agreements containing explicit references to respect for human rights, representing an important advancement and innovation in this matter.
The first agreement was signed with Kenya 54 regarding the conditions and means by which people would be transferred, establishing that people will be treated in accordance with international human rights obligations both prior to and after being transferred.
55
The second agreement was signed with Croatia regarding the latter's participation in EU military operations. The references to human rights in this agreement are the same as in the Kenya agreement, since the exchange of letters between the EU and Kenya were included as an annex to the agreement between the EU and Croatia.
These are the two agreements where there are direct references to respect for human rights.
However, there are other agreements reached by the EU with a view to developing operation ATALANTA, which contain indirect references to respect for human rights, since they take into account (as set up in the agreements) the UN resolutions on the Somali piracy conflict, in which respect for human rights is a condition for fighting piracy. But the ECJ has ruled that human rights can be considered part of the general principles of the EU "derived from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States but also from their international treaty obligations, including especially the ECHR". Naert, "Accountability…, supra n. 13, at. 387. Therefore, through these acts, the EU expresses its intention to apply and take human rights rules into account when deploying these operations.
As in the case of humanitarian law, it is impossible to establish a catalogue of the norms of jus cogens, since there is no consensus as to the kinds of norms that could be classified as such. However, some references can be found to these rules by examining judicial decisions 61 and scholarly work.
62
In relation to EU military operations, certain types of human rights rules will be more closely linked with these kinds of operations. However, it can be stated that most of the rules established as jus cogens by tribunals and scholars could be applicable to EU military operations, such as the prohibition of torture, aggression 63 or genocide. In any case, as a subject of International Law, the EU is bound by international human rights rules of jus cogens, and it must respect them in the deployment of EU military operations, in which special circumstances and conflict require particular attention to be paid to these kinds of norms, and also according to ICJ case law, which in the Advisory Opinion on the Cortés Martín, supra n. 11, at. 124-133; Orakhelashvili refers to different studies on the peremptory character of human rights. See Orakhelashvili, supra n. 46, [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] Hirsch, supra n. 11, at. 30. 63 Even though the recent definition of aggression adopted in Kampala Conference in order to include it in the International Criminal Court Statute (Resolution RC/Res.6). Also the General Assembly adopted in 1974 a definition of aggression that has not been taking into account by the International Criminal Court. GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974. To conclude with sources of obligation, we will make a brief reference to the UN Security Council resolutions which, in the case of operation ATALANTA, are the legal foundation for deployment.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Operation Atalanta), OJ 2009 L 202/84. 66 Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Seychelles on the status of the European Union-led forces in the Republic of Seychelles in the framework of the European Union military operation Atalanta, OJ 2009 L 323/14. As we mentioned before the SOFA applicable to the ALTHEA operation is the same that was applicable to NATO and was included in Dayton Peace Agreement (Appendix A to Annex 1A). The Security Council Resolutions also make reference to human rights, thereby providing another source of obligation, sometimes with express references to the EU, and allow the EU to be bound by certain international norms where, under different circumstances, it would be more difficult to do so.
EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY OPERATIONS PERSONNEL
In order to establish the attribution of actions carried out by military operations of the EU, it is necessary to determine the personnel of the operation responsible for carrying out the different actions and orders.
An easy way to ascertain the personnel of the military operations is to look at the EU agreement with third countries regarding the status of force agreement. These agreements contain one article used to define the different expressions used in the agreement, including the definition of personnel.
As an example, according to the EU agreement with Seychelles on the status of EU-led forces in the Republic of Seychelles within the framework of the EU military operation Atalanta, personnel of EUNAVFOR will be:
"the civilian and military personnel assigned to EUNAVFOR as well as personnel deployed for the preparation of the operation, personnel escorting persons arrested by EUNAVFOR and personnel on mission for a sending state or an EU institution in the framework of the operation, present, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, within the territory of the host state, with the exception but they also established that commitments to operations "will be based on their sovereign decision", also mentioning the participation of third countries.
As we can infer from the Council Conclusions and as is clearly recognized by the Nice European
Council of 2000, the objective was not to create a european army, 81 but rather to make national military capabilities available to the EU to fulfil its responsibilities in the international arena. The states are, by this reasoning, the main contributors to EU military operations, and the national character of the capabilities is clearly expressed in Article 42.1 of the TEU which establishes that missions "shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States".
However, these are not the only capabilities used by the EU to develop its military operations.
As indicated above, the European Council Conclusions included the participation of non-member 76 Article 1.3.g). In this case because of the peculiarity of the mission are also include "personnel escorting persons" that does not appear in the rest of the ongoing or completed missions.
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The responsibility of the international organizations for the activities of their agents has been also studied by the International Law Commission, which considers that the term agent "is intended to refer not only to officials but also to other persons acting for the United Nations on the basis of functions conferred by an organ of the organization". International Law Commission, Second Report on the Responsibility of International Organizations. A/CN.4/541, 2004, at. 9. In relation to the IO's responsibility for their agents See Tomuschat, supra n. 12; Eagleton, supra n. 11; Butkiewicz, supra n. 11; Hirsch, supra n. 11; Cortés Martín, supra n. 11; Fernández Arribas, supra n. 13. , cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces." The agreements include the conditions of participation, which refer to the status of forces or financial aspects, and among which the chain of command will be essential when identifying the attribution of responsibility. These states will also participate in the Contributors' Committee which "will be the main forum where contributing states collectively address questions relating to the employment of their forces in the operation". This agreement is actually a package of agreements that wasn't concluded according Article 24 TEU, contrary it was negotiated and signed by exchanged of letters by the High Representative of the European Union, and it has been considered as a gentlemen agreement. The use of NATO's assets in this specific operation was agreed in an exchange of letters between NATO and the EU.
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The next and later operation deployed with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities was operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004. 96 In this operation, as in CONCORDIA, the Joint Action established recourse to NATO's assets and capabilities, and NATO placed the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSA-CEUR) and the SHAPE 97 at the disposal of the EU.
The collaboration of NATO in these two operations was also based on the "Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans", which outlined "core areas of cooperation and emphasizes the common vision and determination both organizations share to bring stability to the region".
98
Therefore, the use of NATO assets and capabilities has taken place in two EU military operations, and the others were deployed autonomously by the EU.
Having established which personnel would be involved in the military operations, responsible for carrying out the actions and orders that might entail a breach of international law, the status of these personnel in relation to the EU must be clarified: are they EU staff?. A distinction has to be made in relation to this assertion owing to the difference between operations authorized by the UN and those carried out by the UN. In the former, the UN has never 92 EU-NATO: a strategic partnership, <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm>, 30 December 2010. The Background EU-NATO: The framework for permanent relations and Berlin Plus, establishes that "the European Union may request that NATO makes available a NATO European command option for an European Union -led military operation. In this case, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) is the primary candidate for European Union Operation Commander. He will remain at SHAPE where he establishes the EU OHQ". International Law Commission. supra n. 2, at. 21; Siekman, supra n. 14, at. 126.
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Article 6 Force Regulations. See Siekman, supra n. 14, at. 126. 104 capacity "on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security (.,.)". According to article 43.1 TEU these missions shall include "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation". And finally, article 28 TEU refers to cases where the "international situation requires operational action by the Union". Taking into account the reference to these operations in the EU Treaty, it is possible to affirm that members of missions are exercising competences pertaining to the organization and acting on behalf of the EU since they also use the EU flag.
EFFECTIVE CONTROL AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THE ATTRIBUTION OF ACTS
Effective control is one of the main requisites for the attribution of illegal acts to an international organization, but it is also the most complicated to establish because of the absence of definition.
Effective control has been established as a requirement, not only by the main scholars 111 , but also by the ILC, which stated:
"When an organ or agent is placed at the disposal of an international organization, the decisive question in relation to attribution of a given conduct appears to be who has effective control over the conduct in question".
112
In this sense, it has been clearly established by the scholars that effective control is a condition for the attribution of responsibility. However, this reasoning has been contested by the ECHR in its decision on the admissibility of the Behrami and Saramati claims. 113 In this ruling, the ECHR declares its absence of competence ratione personae based on the attribution of responsibility to the UN, as a consequence of its 'ultimate control' 114 . This attribution of responsibility was criticized 115 as it differed from the traditional approach to attribution on the basis of effective control, even though, as established previously, there is no definition of effective control. Other than this, four years later the ECHR, in the Al Jedda case, ruled "that the United Nations Security Council had neither effective control nor ultimate authority and control over the acts and omissions of troops within the Multi-National Force and that the applicant's detention was not, therefore, attributable to the United Nations" For the purposes of this article, we will focus chiefly on the concept of effective control, as it has been widely accepted by the scholars, by the ILC and it has also been alleged by the UN to assume its responsibility in different situations.
(1) What is effective control?
The main problem when it comes to giving a definition of effective control is the multiplicity of types of control to which national norms, mandates, doctrine or agreements refer, all in relation to military operations. Analysing such documents, we find expressions such as "command and control", Martín, supra n. 11, [195] [196] [197] R. Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) at. 113; M. Zwanenburg, supra n. 111, at. 25. 121 Murphy, supra n. 117. at. 118; F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War, (A.W. Sijhoff, Leiden, 1996) at. 91; Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 39; and also several EU agreements i.e: Agreement between the European Union and Montenegro on the participation of Montenegro in the European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Operation Atalanta) OJ 2010 L 88/3.
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Siekman, supra n. 14, at.112; Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 39.
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Seyersted, supra n. 117, at. 118; Murphy, supra n. 117. at. 97.
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Murphy, supra n. 117. at. 99; G. Weissberg, The International Status of the United Nations, (Oceana Publications, New York, 1961) at. 129; McCoubrey and White, supra n. 14, at. 144; Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 39. 125 Bowett, supra n. 14, at. 341.
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Ibid., p. 245.
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About the attribution of conduct and control, see also Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Judgement in the case of the State of the Netherlands v. Hasan Nuhanovic, 6 september 2013. 128 Zwanenburg, supra n. 13, at. 404; D'Aspremont, supra n. 11, at. 97; International Law Commission, supra n. 77, at. 20. 129 Hirsch, supra n. 11, at. 64. See also commentaries on Article 7 DARIO and Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Judgment in the case of The State of the Netherlands v. Hasan Nuhanović, 6 September 2013, at. 24 "the attribution of conduct to the seconding State or the international organization is based on the factual control over the specific conduct, in which all factual circumstances and the special context of the case must be taken into account".
It is possible to consider "full command", which is attributed in some cases to the Force . Command and control, although linked, have been defined as different concepts, and in line with these differences, command "is defined as authority to issue orders and to compel obedience", 140 and control "is the process through which a commander, assisted by staff, organizes, directs and co-ordinates the activities of the assigned forces".
141
Under the command and control of the international organization, and under its authority and the full command of the Force Commander, the national contingents cannot receive instruction or 130 Weissberg, supra n. 121, at. 129; McCoubrey and White, supra n. 14, at. 142. 131 Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 39. Murphy makes reference to the Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine Manual which contains a similar definition. Murphy, supra n. 117. at. 117.
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McCoubrey and White, supra n. 14, at. 144; Weissberg, supra n. 121, at. 129; Bowett, supra n. 14, at. 399. 133 Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 40. Ibid. p. 39. Murphy again takes the definition of the Canadian Forces Joint Doctrine Manual which matches with that of the NATO. Murphy, supra n. 117. at. 117-118. 135 Ibid. at. 40.
136
Bowett, supra n. 14, at. 303; Zwanenburg, supra n. 11, at. 40. 137 Ibid. at. 39.
138
Regulation 13 UNEF. Bowett, supra n. 14, at. 344. 139 Zwanenburg, supra n. 111, at. 25; Murphy, Seyersted, supra n. 117, [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] [96] [97] Murphy, supra n. 117. at. 115. commanders. According to these competences and tasks of the organization and its organs, and also taking into account the obligations of national contingents, it could be argued that in this situation an international organization has effective control over an operation.
In spite of this definition of tasks and obligations, there are certain situations in which national contingents still receive orders from their national authorities; in such cases, the organization loses the effective control. In these situations, the international organization in theory had effective control, but in practice it was exercised by national authorities; the contingents carried out the orders of national authorities or breached the orders issued by the Force Commander. The UNOSOM II mission is an example of this situation. In this mission, a complex system of command and control was established whereby in theory, the UN had command and control but in practice, it was retained by the United States Officer in Somalia.
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In relation to the appointment of the national commander, Bowett maintains, specifically in the case of the UNEF and ONUC, that the Force Commander "had no control over the appointment of the commanders of the various national contingents although the regulations of the Force". Bowett, supra n. 14, at. 338.
Having ascertained that the UN has command and control over its peace-keeping forces, the attribution of responsibility for its actions should be easier; the next step should be to confirm that the UN was actually exercising effective control over the troops.
In most cases, command and control and effective control have both been exercised by the UN, giving rise to the assumption of responsibility by the Organization. This was the case in ONUC, the first operation in which the UN recognized its responsibility, 158 or the case of operation UNFCYP in Cyprus; 159 in both cases bilateral agreements were signed with the host countries providing a settlement of disputed procedures. 160 In any case, the practice of the UN confirms the declaration of the United Nations Secretary General in response to the protest of Russia against the payment of compensation in Congo. This declaration stated that "[i]t has always been the policy of the UN, acting through the SecretaryGeneral, to compensate individuals who have suffered damages for which the organization was legally liable".
(3) Effective control in EU military operations
To establish the effective control of the EU over EU military operations, it is necessary to analyse the chain of command of those operations and determine who might exercise control over them.
Even though agreements between an international organization and participating states, as well as the internal norms regarding the control and command of operations are not a decisive factor when it comes to establishing effective control over an operation, these norms do play an important role in terms of understanding the functioning of the operation and analysing which authority was exercising effective control. Naert, "Accountability…, supra n. 13, at. 379. On the contrary Cortés Martín considers that in CFSP "where fundamental elements of EU normative control are missing, since there is no internal judicial organ that can ensure effective compliance by EU member States. As a result, EU member States would continue bearing responsibility for matters covered by CSFP, while the EU could incur responsibility based, not on the rule of attribution, but on the rule of responsibility as stated in the Commission´s article 17 on the circumvention of an international obligations through a decision or transfer of control was similar, and it was the Force Commander who exercised command and control in the field of operation on behalf of the UN. Specifically in the case of ONUC, the chain of command ran from Secretary General under the authority of the Security Council and General Assembly through the Officer-in-charge to the Commander. 170 However, as observed above, command and control are not decisive in terms of establishing effective control over the operation and consequently the responsibility of the Organization; it is necessary, therefore, to look at specific conduct to know who was exercising control at that moment. The operation unfurled as follows: when the vessel was hijacked, a Spanish flagship, which was part of the ATALANTA contingent, followed the hijacked vessel until it stopped and two pirates left the vessel in a skiff. The Spanish commander, in order to arrest the pirates, requested permission from the Spanish Government to board the skiff 174 , instead of requesting authorization from the appropriate European bodies which were in command of the operation as mentioned previously. authorization addressed to members". J.M., Cortés Martín, supra n. 8, at. 196 . Regarding EU operations and chain of command see also Aznar Gómez, supra n. 18, at. 195-200 170 Bowett, supra n. 14, at. 339. "Although it may not frequently occur in practice, dual or even multiple attribution of conduct cannot be excluded. Thus, attribution of a certain conduct to an international organization does not imply that the same conduct cannot be attributed to a State; nor does attribution of conduct to a State rule out attribution of the same conduct to an international organization. One could also envisage conduct being simultaneously attributed to two or more international organizations, for instance when they establish a joint organ and act through that organ". International Law Commission, supra n. 2, at. 16. See Aznar Gómez, supra n. 18, at. 193. 173 Nollkaemper, supra n. 167, at. 1153. In any case, even though the Spanish flagship was part of Operation ATALANTA and was under the command and control of European bodies, the final decision to board the skiff was made by a national government, which makes it difficult to verify whether at that moment the EU had effective control over that action, also making it difficult to establish the responsibility of the Organization in the event of a breach of International Law.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It can be inferred from this study that it is not possible to establish a general rule to attribute the actions of EU operations to the Organization.
The EU, like all subjects of International Law, is bound by different rules of International Law that are applicable to military operations, particularly humanitarian law and human rights, and it is possible to infer this obligation from the EU norms that are applicable to EU military operations.
These norms largely focus on private individuals and the protection of their essential rights.
Therefore, it becomes necessary to guarantee respect for these rules. Any breach of these norms by EU operations begs the question of responsibility and the issue of who can be held responsible for that action.
For an action to be considered the responsibility of the EU, it must be established whether the person or organ that breached the norm was an organ of the Organization or acting on behalf the Organization.
The concept of an organ placed at the disposal of an organization allows us to conclude that the organs and persons acting in an EU military operation are acting on behalf of the EU to achieve the objectives of the Organization. In this sense, it is possible to affirm that the personnel of EU military operations have been placed at the disposal of the EU, given that they fulfil the requirements established not only by the scholars but also by the ILC.
Finally, having identified the personnel acting on behalf of the Organization, it must be established whether they are under the effective control of the EU, which is the main requirement for establishing responsibility.
In the case of the EU, the chain of command can help to determine who is exercising effective control. From the chain of command, it is possible to infer the duties of the different bodies, but it does not determine whether, in the precise moment the norm was breached, the EU was exercising its effective control over the specific action, even though it was part of its duties. As indicated by the example of operation ATALANTA, effective control over a specific action can be exercised by a different body from the one to which this has been allocated. Therefore, it will be necessary to look at a specific action and to analyse who was giving the precise order and consequently exercising effective control, in order to conclude whether or not responsibility lies with the EU.
In conclusion, the EU can be held responsible because it is bound by international norms.
However, its responsibility for the activities of its military operations will depend on the interpretation of the concept of organs placed at the disposal of the Organization, as well as the concept of effective control. Therefore, it would be helpful for international tribunals to establish a common definition of the concept of effective control which would provide the main basis for the attribution of responsibility.
These difficulties determining the responsibility of the EU for actions carried out by its military operations could generate mistrust and legal insecurity among third parties, but it seems to be the best option to maintain the EU's independence, authority and control over its operations.
